## Contents

1 General Security Principles 4
   1.1 Protection of User Data in Dashlane 4
   1.2 Local Access to User Data 4
   1.3 Local Data Usage After decrypting 5
   1.4 Use of 2FA Applications to Increase User Data Safety 5
   1.5 Authentication 5
   1.6 Communication 6
   1.7 Details on Authentication Flow 7
   1.8 Keeping the User Experience Simple 10
   1.9 Use of 2FA Application to Secure the Connection to a New Device 10
   1.10 2-Factor Authentication 11
   1.11 Sharing Data Between Users 11
   1.12 Account Recovery 12
   1.13 Single Sign On (SSO) 13
      1.13.1 Introduction 13
      1.13.2 General principle 13
      1.13.3 Services 13
      1.13.4 Keys, secrets and certificates 14
      1.13.5 Workflow 15

2 Impact on Potential Attack Scenarios 16
   2.1 Minimal Security Architecture 16
   2.2 Most Common Security Architecture 16
   2.3 Dashlane Security Architecture 17
   2.4 Anti-Clickjacking Provisions 19
   2.5 Same-origin Policy 19
   2.6 Memory Protection 19
   2.7 Intel SGX 20
1 General Security Principles

1.1 Protection of User Data in Dashlane

Protection of user data in Dashlane relies on 4 separate secrets:

- **The User Master Password:**
  - It is never stored on Dashlane servers, nor are any of its derivatives (including hashes).
  - By default, it is not stored locally on disk on any of the user’s devices; we simply use it to (de)crypt the local files containing the user data.
  - It is stored locally upon user request when enabling the feature “Remember my Master Password”.
  - In addition, we ensure that the user’s Master Password is never transmitted over the internet.

- In some cases (local storage), we use an **Intermediate Key** (random 32-byte) encrypted with the derived Master Password.

- A unique **User Device Key** for each device enabled by a user:
  - Auto generated for each device.
  - Used for authentication.

- A **Local Secret Key** generated locally used to secure communication between the Dashlane application and the browser plugins. The key is exchanged using local visual pairing (and Diffie-Hellman) when needed.

1.2 Local Access to User Data

Access to the user’s data requires using the **User Master Password** which is only known by the user. It is used to generate the symmetric Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 256-bit key for encryption and decryption of the user’s personal data on the user’s device.

We use Webcrypto API for most browser based cryptography and the native libraries for IOS and Android.

On Windows and MacOS, the user’s data encryption and decryption is performed using OpenSSL:

- A 32-byte salt is generated using the OpenSSL RAND_bytes function for the desktop apps (encrypting) or reading it from the AES file (decrypting).

- The User Master Password is used, with the salt, to generate the AES 256-bit key that will be used for (en|de)cryption. We use Argon2d, by default, with the following parameters: iterations = 3, memory = 32Mo, parallelization = 2. We also support PBKDF2-SHA2 with 200,000 iterations.

- The 16-byte initialization vector is chosen randomly.

- Then, the data is (en|de)crypted using AES CBC-HMAC mode.

- When encrypting, the salt and the Initialization Vector (IV) are written in the AES file.
1.3 Local Data Usage After decrypting

Once the user has input their Master Password locally in Dashlane and their user data has been decrypted, data is loaded in memory.

The Dashlane client operates within significant constraints to use decrypted user data effectively and securely:

- Dashlane processes decrypt and access individual passwords to autofill them on websites or to save credentials without having to ask the user for the Master Password each time.
- The passwords are sent from different processes through named pipes or web sockets from core to plugins (but are encrypted using AES first).
- The Argon2d (or PBKDF2) derivation used to compute the AES keys adds significant latency (on purpose to protect against brute force attacks). See in paragraph Memory Protection for more on memory management.

1.4 Use of 2FA Applications to Increase User Data Safety

At any time, a user can link their account to a 2FA application on their mobile device (an example among others is Google Authenticator). All of their data, both the data stored locally and the data sent to Dashlane servers for synchronization purposes are then encrypted with a new key, which is generated by a combination of the User Master Password and a randomly generated key called the User Secondary Key stored on Dashlane server, as described in the following steps:

- The user links their Dashlane account with their 2FA application.
- Dashlane servers generate and store a User Secondary Key, which is sent to the user's client application.
- All personal data are encrypted with a new symmetric AES 256 bits key generated client side from both the User Master Password and the User Secondary Key.
- The User Secondary Key is never stored locally.
- The next time the user tries to log into Dashlane, they will be asked by Dashlane servers to provide a One-Time Password generated by the 2FA application. Upon receiving and verifying this One-Time Password, Dashlane servers will send the User Secondary Key to the client application, allowing the user to decrypt their data.

Doing so, user data can be decrypted only by having both the User Master Password, and the 2FA application linked to the user’s account.

1.5 Authentication

As some of Dashlane’s services are cloud-based (data synchronization between multiple devices for instance) there is a need to authenticate the user on Dashlane servers.

Authentication of the user on Dashlane servers is based on the User Device Key and has no relationship with the User Master Password.

When a user creates an account or adds a new device to synchronize their data, a new User Device Key is generated by the servers. The User Device Key is composed of
40 random bytes generated using the OpenSSL RAND_byte function. The 8 first bytes are the access key and 32 remaining bytes are the secret key.

This User Device Key is received by the user’s device and is stored locally in the user data, encrypted as all other user data as explained earlier. On the servers’ side, the secret key part is encrypted so that employees cannot impersonate a given user device. When a user has gained access to their data using their Master Password, Dashlane is able to access their User Device Key to authenticate them on our servers without any user interaction.

As a result, Dashlane does not have to store the user Master Password to perform authentication.

### 1.6 Communication

All communications between the Dashlane application and the Dashlane servers are secured with HTTPS. HTTPS connections on the client side are performed using OpenSSL. On the server side, we use a DigiCert High Assurance CA-3 certificate [2].

The HTTPS communications between Dashlane application and the Dashlane servers are using SSL/TLS connections.

Main TLS protocol steps are as follow:

- The client and the server negotiate to choose the best cipher and hash algorithm available on both side.
- The server sends a digital certificate.
- The client verifies the certificate by contacting a Certificate Authority.
- The client encrypts a random number with the server’s public key and sends it to the server.
- The server decrypts this number, and both sides use this number to generate a symmetric key, used to encrypt and decrypt data.

Finally, communication between the Dashlane browser plugin and the Dashlane application is secured using with AES 256 using the OpenSSL library:

- A 32-byte salt is generated using the OpenSSL RAND_bytes function (encrypting) or reading it from the inter-process message (decrypting).
- The Dashlane Private Key is used, with the salt, to generate the AES 256-bit key that will be used for (de|en)crypting.
- The IV is set to a random 16-byte value.
- Then, the data is (de|en)crypted using CBC-HMAC mode.
- When encrypting, the salt is written on inter-process message
1.7 Details on Authentication Flow

The initial registration for a user follows the flow described in Figure 2.
As seen in Figure 2, the User Master Password is never used to perform server authentication, and the only keys stored on our servers are the User Device Keys.
When adding a second device, the important point is that Dashlane needs to make sure the user adding the additional device is indeed the legitimate owner of the account. This is to gain additional protection in the event the User Master Password has been compromised and an attacker who does not have access to their already-enabled device is trying to access the account from another device.

As shown on Figure 3, when a user is attempting to connect to a Dashlane account on a device that has not yet been authorized for this account, Dashlane generates a One-Time Password (a Token) that is sent to the user either to the email address used to create the Dashlane account initially or by text message to the user’s mobile phone if the user has chosen to provide their mobile phone number.

In order to enable the new device, the user has to enter both their Master Password and the Token. Only once this two-factor authentication has been performed will Dashlane servers start synchronizing the user data on the new device. All communication is handled with HTTPS and the user data only travels in AES-256 encrypted form. Please note again that the User Master Password never transmits over the internet.
1.8 Keeping the User Experience Simple

All along, our goal is to keep the user experience simple and to hide all the complexity from the user. Security is growing more and more important for users of cloud services but they are not necessarily ready to sacrifice convenience for more security.

Even though what goes on in the background during the initial registration steps is complex (see Figure 4), the user experience is very simple. All they have to do is to pick a (strong) Master Password, and all the other keys are generated by the application without user intervention.

When adding an additional device, the process is equally simple while remaining highly secure through the use of two-factor authentication described in Figure 5.

1.9 Use of 2FA Application to Secure the Connection to a New Device

At any time, a user can link their Dashlane account to a 2FA application on their mobile device. When they attempt to connect into a new device, instead of sending
them a One-Time Password by email, Dashlane asks the user to provide a One-Time password generated by the 2FA application.

After receiving and verifying the One-Time Password provided by the user, Dashlane servers will store the **User Device Key** generated by the client application, as described in Figure 5

### 1.10 2-Factor Authentication

Dashlane offers 2-Factor Authentication that can be activated from the security settings in the desktop application to force the usage of a second factor each time the user logs into Dashlane.

Supported two-factor methods include 2FA applications such as Google Authenticator or U2F compatible devices such as Yubikeys. U2F is an open protocol from the FIDO Alliance (https://fidoalliance.org). Dashlane is a member of the FIDO Alliance.

### 1.11 Sharing Data Between Users

Dashlane allows users to share credentials and secure notes with other users, or with groups of users, in such a way that Dashlane never directly accesses a user’s data at any point. In fact, Dashlane’s servers never have access to the content of shared data.

Dashlane’s sharing relies on asymmetric encryption; upon account creation, a unique pair of public and private RSA keys are created by the Dashlane application for each user. The private key is stored in the user’s personal data, and the public key is sent to Dashlane’s servers. RSA public and private keys are generated using the OpenSSL function `RSA_generate_key_ex`, using a key length of 2048 bits, with 3 as a public exponent.

Here is the process for a user, Alice, to share a credential with another user, Bob:

- Alice asks Dashlane’s servers for Bob’s public key.
- Alice generates a 256-bit AES key, using a cryptographically secure random function on each platform. This key is unique for each shared item and is called an **ObjectKey**.
- Alice encrypts the **ObjectKey** using Bob’s public key, creating a **BobEncryptedObjectKey**.
- Alice sends the **BobEncryptedObjectKey** to Dashlane’s servers.
- Alice encrypts her credential with the **ObjectKey**, using AES-CBC and HMAC-SHA2 creating an **EncryptedCredential**.
- Alice sends the **EncryptedCredential** to Dashlane’s servers.
- When Bob logs in, Dashlane’s servers inform him that Alice wants to share a credential with him. Bob must manually accept the item in his Dashlane application and sign his acceptance using his private key.
- Upon acceptance, Dashlane’s servers send Bob the **BobEncryptedObjectKey**, and the **EncryptedCredential**.
- Bob decrypts the **BobEncryptedObjectKey** with his private key and gets the **ObjectKey**.
- Bob decrypts the **EncryptedCredential** with the **ObjectKey** and adds Alice’s plain text credential to his own personal data.
Sharing data with a group of users follows the same security principle: Use a user’s RSA public and private keys to send protected AES keys, sign a user’s action, and use intermediary AES keys to exchange data.

To summarize:

- Each user has a pair of public and private RSA 2048-bit keys:
  - Public keys are used to encrypt information only a specific user can decrypt.
  - Private keys are used to sign actions users are performing.
- For each credential or secure note shared, an intermediary AES 256-bit key is created and used to perform data encryption and decryption.

### 1.12 Account Recovery

Account Recovery allows Dashlane Business users to regain access to Dashlane by resetting their Master Password. Our patented process preserves a zero-knowledge architecture. Through Account Recovery, Master Passwords are never stored on any servers nor transmitted in any form.

Our solution allows users to reset their Master Password and recover the data stored on an authorized device. Account Recovery is an optional feature admins can activate for their Dashlane Business account in the Admin Console.

To enable recovery, the user’s local key — itself encrypted with the user’s Master Password — is also encrypted using a unique user recovery key, which is generated and used for all of the user’s devices when they opt into Account Recovery. This user recovery key is then encrypted using a unique server-side recovery key, which is only known to Dashlane and the user’s client devices. When an admin enables Account Recovery, their public key is used to encrypt the server-side recovery key which, as aforementioned, was already used to encrypt the user’s recovery key. An admin can then, via their private key, later access the user’s recovery key protected by the server-side recovery key.

When a user requests Account Recovery, they are asked to verify their account and create a new Master Password. A critical step of the recovery process is the verification of the identity of the user. It is up to the admin, acting as a trusted third-party, to ensure the user requesting recovery is indeed the owner of the account. If an admin approves the request, the server-side recovery key, which protects the user’s recovery key, is securely exchanged from the admin to the user through a public/private key system. On the user’s device, the user’s recovery key is then decrypted using the server-side recovery key, provided by Dashlane after the user’s identity and request have been validated. The user’s recovery key is then used to decrypt the user’s local key, which in turn is used to decrypt the user’s data. The recovered data is then re-encrypted with the new Master Password and re-synced to the Dashlane servers.

As this process involves a Master Password change, all of the user’s devices have to be registered once again to Dashlane for the user to access their newly encrypted data.

Important privacy note: the Account Recovery process relies on the Admin being a trusted Third-Party. In case the Dashlane Admin has access to both the user’s device and the user’s email used as a Dashlane account, he would be in a position to trigger an Account Recovery from the user’s device and get access to the user’s vault and personal data.
1.13 Single Sign On (SSO)

1.13.1 Introduction

Dashlane Business supports login with Single Sign On (SSO), using any SAML 2.0 enabled IDP.

In a single sign-on setup, the user doesn't have to input a Dashlane Master Password. Instead, a random key is generated at account creation. This key (the data encryption key) is delivered to the Dashlane Application after the user successfully logs in to the IDP, and is used as a symmetric encryption key to encrypt and decrypt the user data.

This section details how the key is stored and delivered to the user in order to make sure that the zero knowledge principle is maintained.

1.13.2 General principle

In order to avoid storing all the keys in one place, the data encryption key is composed of 2 parts:

- 64 random bytes hold by the SSO connector.
- 64 random bytes hold by Dashlane's servers, in the cloud.

The SSO connector is a server component that the customer operates (either in the cloud or on premise). It acts as the service provider in the SAML 2.0 flow. After a successful authentication to the SSO Connector using SAML, the first part of the key is delivered to the Dashlane Client Application, along with a token that allows to get the second part from the Dashlane Server.

Once both parts of the keys are retrieved by the Client Application, they are XORed together, and the resulting 64 bytes are used as a symmetric key to encrypt and decrypt user data.

This system ensures zero-knowledge as the first part of the key is only known by the SSO Connector and the Client Application, both of which are managed by the customer.

It also makes sure that a compromised SSO Connector cannot be used to fetch the keys of users without leaving traces on Dashlane Servers (an API call to Dashlane Server is required to fetch the second part of the key).

1.13.3 Services

Dashlane Server / API (API) The servers operated by Dashlane in the cloud, where user data is stored encrypted.

SSO Connector (SP) A service acting as the service provider in the SAML 2.0 flow. The service is distributed by Dashlane, but hosted and managed by the customer on premise or in the cloud.

Identity Provider (IdP) The SAML 2.0 identity provider (e.g. ADFS, Azure AD, Okta) of the customer. This service is not provided by Dashlane. It is operated by the customer or by a third party.
1.13.4 Keys, secrets and certificates

**IdP key and certificate (IdP_Key / IdP_Cert)** Public and private keys of the IdP. The private key is held by the IdP, while the certificate needs to be provided to the SP in the configuration file. It is used by the IdP to sign and by the SP to verify the SAML assertions.

**Master SP Key / SSO Connector Key (master_sp_key)** A 64 bytes secret key, generated randomly by the Team Admin Console (client side). It is stored in the configuration file of the SP, and is only known by the Team Admin. It is used by the SP to encrypt/decrypt the user_sp_key before storing them in the API.

**User SP Key (user_sp_key)** A 64 bytes secret key, generated randomly by the SP. It is stored encrypted in the API.

**User Server Key (server_key)** A 64 bytes secret key, generated randomly by the client. It is stored unencrypted in the API.

**User vault key (vault_key)** user_sp_key XOR server_key. It is used by the client to encrypt/decrypt user’s data before storing them in the API.
### 1.13.5 Workflow

1. **User Device**
   - Client app has 0 / 2 keys
   - Request SSO Authentication
   - Trigger SAML Flow

2. **SSO Connector**
   - Login with SSO

3. **IdP**
   - Return Signed SAML Assertion

4. **Dashlane Servers**
   - Submit Signed SAML Assertion

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- **User Device**
- **SSO Connector**
- **IdP**
- **Dashlane Servers**

---

**Figure 6: SSO Workflow**

- **Client app has 0 / 2 keys**
  - Request SSO Authentication
  - Trigger SAML Flow

- **Login with SSO**

- **Return Signed SAML Assertion**

- **Submit Signed SAML Assertion**
  - Check the SAML Assertion is valid
  - Generate a random user_sp_key and encrypt it with master_sp_key

- **Send encrypted user_sp_key**

- **Store encrypted user_sp_key if none exist for this user**
  - Else: Fetch the existing encrypted user_sp_key

- **Generate random sso_token**

- **Return existing or newly registered encrypted user_sp_key + sso_token**

- **Decrypt user_sp_key using master_sp_key**

- **Return user_sp_key + sso_token**

- **Client app has 1 / 2 keys**

- **Request server_key (authenticating with sso_token)**

- **Check sso_token**

- **Return server_key**

- **Client app has 2 / 2 keys**

- **Compute vault_key=XOR(user_sp_key, server_key)**
2 Impact on Potential Attack Scenarios

Today, cloud-based services make various choices to encrypt their user data. These choices have important consequences in terms of security.

2.1 Minimal Security Architecture

Cloud services can use a single private secret, usually under their control, to encrypt all user data. This is obviously a simpler choice from an implementation standpoint, plus it offers the advantage of facilitating deduplication of data which can provide important economic benefits when the user data volume is important. Obviously, this is not an optimal scenario from a security standpoint since if the key is compromised (hacker attack or rogue employee), all user data is exposed.

![Diagram showing potential attack scenarios with minimal security](image)

**Figure 7: Potential Attack Scenarios With Minimal Security**

2.2 Most Common Security Architecture

A better alternative is to use a different key for each user. The most common practice is to ask the user to provide a (strong) Master Password and to derive the encryption key for each user from their Master Password. However, to keep things simple for the user, many services or applications tend to also use the user’s Master Password as an authentication key for the connection to their services. This implies that an attacker could access a user’s vault by just knowing the master password. It could also easily lead to implementation errors (missing salt/rainbow tables attacks, wrong/weak hashing, etc.).
Rogue employee / External hackers

AES user data files stolen

Master Passwords hash massive theft

Access to user data

Large scale brute force attack impossible (each vault needs to be attacked separately)

Figure 8: Potential Attack Scenarios With Most Cloud Architecture

2.3 Dashlane Security Architecture

In order to make this attack scenario impossible, we have made the decision to separate the key used for user data encryption and the key used for server based authentication (see Figure 9). The user data is encrypted with a key which is a derivative of the User Master Password. A separate User Device Key (unique to each device-user couple) is used to perform authentication on Dashlane Servers. This User Device Key is automatically generated by Dashlane. As a result:

- Encryption keys for user data are not stored anywhere.
- No Dashlane employee can ever access user data.
- User data is protected by the Master Password even if Dashlane’s servers are compromised.
Rogue employee / External hackers

AES user data files stolen

Large scale brute force attack impossible (each vault needs to be attacked separately)

User Device

Keys hash stolen

User Device

AES user data files stolen

Large scale brute force attack impossible (each vault needs to be attacked separately)

Figure 9: Potential Attack Scenarios With Dashlane’s Security Architecture

Even if this scenario happens, a rogue employee or an external hacker would have a very hard time executing a brute force or dictionary attack on the AES user data files, as we use the Argon2d (or PBKDF2-SHA2) algorithm. As the user data are encrypted using a salted key which is a derivative of their User Master Password, no rainbow attacks are possible.

As an example, this is a benchmark of attempts to decrypt AES files using a Xeon 1.87GHz (4 cores):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of brute force attack</th>
<th>AES 256 Time to get the password on a Xeon 1.87 GHz (4 cores)</th>
<th>Argon2 (3 iterations, 32 Mb)</th>
<th>AES 256 with PBKDF2-SHA2 with 200,000 iterations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 million-term dictionary</td>
<td>2.8 seconds</td>
<td>46 days</td>
<td>~ 450 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alphanumerical (small caps + digits) password of 7 characters</td>
<td>15.7 hours</td>
<td>111,669 years</td>
<td>~ 1,000 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alphanumerical (small caps + digits) password of 8 characters</td>
<td>23.6 days</td>
<td>6,923,519 years</td>
<td>~ 45,000 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Benchmark of attempts to decrypt AES files using a Xeon1.87GHz (4 cores)

This table represents the time it would take on a Xeon 1.87 GHz (4 cores) to break a password used to protect Dashlane user data. Without using Argon2 or PBKDF2, those numbers show that even with a strong password, an attacker would be able to crack the user password in less than a month.

Using Argon2 or PBKDF2, and given that Dashlane enforces reasonably strong password requirements[(3)](At least one upper case, one lower case, 1 digit, and at least 8 characters), an attack would be impractical.

Obviously, there is a limit to any security architecture. If the user’s computer is physically compromised and an attacker is able to install a keylogger allowing them to capture all keystrokes, then no password-based security system will prevent data
theft or piracy. This is why the end user still remains responsible for physically protecting their computer from non-authorized access and for making sure they are not installing potentially infected software. Our point is that in any event, a Dashlane user is significantly more secure than if they store sensitive personal data in Word or Excel documents, uses their memory or a system that necessitates weak password patterns, or stores passwords in their browser caches.

2.4 Anti-Clickjacking Provisions

In order to protect Dashlane users from rogue websites that would attempt to use clickjacking tactics or other JavaScript based attacks to extract data from the Dashlane application, we have made sure none of the webpage-based interactions involving user data unrelated to this website use JavaScript.

The popups used to trigger form-filling on a webpage uses various browser security APIs to prevent control from the JavaScript of the visited page. As a result, a rogue website cannot trigger a click that would cause Dashlane to believe that the user has actually clicked, and therefore, cannot extract information unless the user explicitly clicks in the field.

2.5 Same-origin Policy

Dashlane automatically logs users into websites. In order to avoid providing user’s information to rogue websites, the same-origin policy is always respected.

First, a credential saved by Dashlane when it has been used on a website with the URL of mysubdomain.mydomain.com will not be automatically filled on another website with the URL of myothersubdomain.mydomain.com. This prevents the credential of a specific website from being provided to another website which would share the same top-level domain name.

Also, a credential saved by Dashlane when it has been used on a website with a URL beginning with https will not be automatically filled on another website with a URL beginning with http.

2.6 Memory Protection

A problem can arise if an attacker takes control of the user’s client device. In that scenario, the attacker could retrieve the decrypted user data from the memory.

This is an extreme scenario as, in that case, the attacker can take control of many parts, including adding a keylogger to capture the Master Password.

- Mobile operating systems (Android, IOS) ensure that no process can ever access the memory of another process and are not directly affected.
- Sandboxed process: Windows store or Mac app store apps can’t access other process memory, either.
- Non-Sandboxed desktop apps are an issue. They can access memory with classic system API (CreateRemoteThread, ReadProcessMemory, WriteProcessMemory on Windows) or classic debugging tools.
- On Windows, Dashlane binaries are compiled with ASLR enabled.
Dashlane is working on adding additional memory protections (add intermediate encryption keys, wipe chunks of memory before releasing, etc.), but we also need to take into account that if the attacker has control over the process memory, they can already cause a lot of harm and can bypass such countermeasures:

▷ Hook process decryption functions.
▷ Add a keylogger.
▷ Hook SSL http functions and retrieve passwords.
▷ Tamper certificates authorities.
▷ Debug, trace, add watches, and bypass added security.

Finally, we believe the system integrity and security between processes is a system function and Dashlane cannot (and should not) reinvent the wheel and add useless complexity that could lead to other vulnerabilities and have negative side-effects on antivirus.

2.7 Intel SGX

Dashlane Windows application supports the Intel SGX protocol, which adds another layer of security for Dashlane customers using Intel CPU compatible with SGX instructions.

When SGX-compatible hardware is detected by Dashlane, it enables the use of the secure enclave to further protect the encryption key. When this feature is enabled, the key is derived two times:

• One time using the classic Dashlane derivation function (today Argon2d or PBKDF2).
• A second time using the SGX enclave to do another derivation. The salt of the derivation is confined in the enclave and can’t be read by anyone. The encryption is also done in the enclave, so an attacker can never access this key.